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Abstract 
Making accurate judgments is an essential skill in everyday life. Although how 
different memory abilities relate to categorization and judgment processes has been 
hotly debated, the question is far from resolved. We contribute to the solution by 
investigating how individual differences in memory abilities affect judgment 
performance in two tasks that induced rule-based or exemplar-based judgment 
strategies. In a study with 279 participants, we investigated how working memory and 
episodic memory affect judgment accuracy and strategy use. As predicted, participants 
switched strategies between tasks. Furthermore, structural equation modeling showed 
that the ability to solve rule-based tasks was predicted by working memory, whereas 
episodic memory predicted judgment accuracy in the exemplar-based task. Last, the 
probability of choosing an exemplar-based strategy was related to better episodic 
memory, but strategy selection was unrelated to working memory capacity. In sum, 
our results suggest that different memory abilities are essential for successfully 
adopting different judgment strategies. 
 
Keywords: Judgment; working memory; episodic memory; rule-based and exemplar-
based processes 
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“The only way to learn the rules of this Game of games is to take the usual prescribed 
course, which requires many years.” (Hermann Hesse) 
 
In Hesse’s fictitious country Castalia, one of the greatest honors is to be elected 
Magister Ludi, the master of the glass bead game. This game integrates knowledge 
from all the major scholarly disciplines—from mathematics to music to philosophy—
by storing this academic knowledge in the form of game symbols. During the game, 
these symbols are combined to form new ideas according to the grammar of the game. 
A challenging glass bead play thus hinges on two cornerstones of cognition: long-term 
memory and working memory. A glass bead player needs to store knowledge in long-
term memory and retrieve this knowledge during the game; combining this knowledge 
requires the ability to manipulate information while keeping it activated for a short 
time—one key function of working memory. 
Long-term memory and working memory are crucial for solving various tasks 
in everyday life. When shopping, for example, one must remember the items one 
intended to buy—a typical long-term memory task. Quickly summing up the prices in 
the shopping basket, by contrast, places strong demands on working memory. The 
ability to make accurate judgments may also hinge on basic memory processes. To 
judge, for instance, the attractiveness of a job offer, people may recall past work 
experiences from long-term memory. Alternatively, people may form an initial 
judgment and repeatedly update this judgment by gathering information from the job 
advertisement—a process that draws on key functions of working memory. These 
examples highlight that one can hardly think of judgments without considering 
memory. 
Indeed, the role of memory in making judgments cannot be overstated (Weber, 
Goldstein, & Barlas, 1995). Consequently, the interplay of long-term and working 
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memory plays a major role in theories in categorization, judgment, and decision 
making (Ashby & O’Brien, 2005; Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research Group, 
1999; Juslin, Karlsson, & Olsson, 2008; Marewski & Schooler, 2011). To what degree 
different categorization and judgment strategies draw on distinct memory systems has 
animated a particularly heated scientific debate (Ashby & O’Brien, 2005; Knowlton, 
1999; Lewandowsky, 2011; Newell, Dunn, & Kalish, 2011; Nosofsky & Zaki, 1998; 
Smith, Patalano, & Jonides, 1998). In this vein, a growing body of research 
investigating the role of working memory capacity has suggested that higher capacity 
helps people make more accurate judgments and categorizations (Lewandowsky, 
2011; Weaver & Stewart, 2012). In contrast, how long-term memory contributes to 
judgments and categorizations has been investigated in only a few studies (Ashby & 
O’Brien, 2005; Del Missier et al., 2013; Tomlinson, Marewski, & Dougherty, 2011). 
Furthermore, we can think of no study that considered how various memory abilities 
interact with different categorization or judgment strategies. 
Our goal was to fill this gap and shed light on which memory abilities underlie 
judgments. Specifically, we investigated how individual differences in working 
memory and episodic memory interact with the judgment strategies people use. 
Focusing on two fundamental strategy types—rule based and exemplar based 
(Erickson & Kruschke, 1998; Juslin, Olsson, & Olsson, 2003; von Helversen & 
Rieskamp, 2008, 2009)—we examined how memory abilities influence the selection 
and execution of these judgment strategies and, ultimately, judgment performance. 
We first provide an overview of memory abilities and the strategies underlying 
human judgments. We then explore theoretically how judgment strategies are 
grounded in memory and how memory abilities encourage the selection of different 
judgment strategies. Finally, we report an individual difference study examining how 
memory abilities influence judgment accuracy and strategy use. 
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Memory Abilities 
Memory refers to people’s ability to store information. Memory research 
principally distinguishes long-term memory from working memory. While long-term 
memory stores information for minutes to years, working memory serves the purpose 
of manipulating information and maintaining this information in a highly active state 
for a short time (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968). In recent theories, working memory is 
said to consist of activated representations in long-term memory (Oberauer, 2009; 
Unsworth & Engle, 2007). Evidence from individual difference studies suggests that 
working memory correlates with performance in long-term memory tasks (Del Missier 
et al., 2013; Mogle, Lovett, Stawski, & Sliwinski, 2008; Unsworth, 2010). 
Specifically, working memory may control encoding into and strategic retrieval from 
long-term memory (Baddeley, Lewis, Eldridge, & Thomson, 1984; Craik, Govoni, 
Naveh-Benjamin, & Anderson, 1996; Rosen & Engle, 1997; Unsworth, Brewer, & 
Spillers, 2013). 
Furthermore, memory research has distinguished implicit from explicit long-
term memory (we use the term episodic memory to refer to explicit long-term memory 
of specific events). Whereas explicit memory measures reflect conscious recollection 
of facts or episodes, in implicit memory tests previous experiences facilitate 
performance without necessarily requiring their conscious recollection (Roediger, 
1990; Squire & Zola, 1996). Countless studies have shown dissociations between 
implicit and explicit memory tests and these dissociations have often been taken as 
evidence of two distinct memory systems (Squire & Zola, 1996). For instance, implicit 
memory measures, such as word stem completion, are not correlated with episodic 
memory measures, such as cued recall (Bruss & Mitchell, 2009; Fleischman, Wilson, 
Gabrieli, Bienias, & Bennett, 2004; Perruchet & Beaveux, 1989). At the same time, 
the idea that there exist distinct systems has been repeatedly challenged (e.g., Berry, 
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Shanks, Speekenbrink, & Henson, 2012; Dew & Cabeza, 2011; Roediger, 1990). 
Recently, for instance, Berry et al. (2012) suggested that a single process model 
accommodates performance differences between recognition and implicit repetition 
priming. In addition, several studies raised methodological concerns about the 
reliability of implicit memory measures (Buchner & Brandt, 2003; Buchner & 
Wippich, 2000; Meier & Perrig, 2000). It remains an open question if memory can 
best be understood as two distinct systems. 
Judgment Strategies 
People make judgments every day ranging from estimating the probability of 
rainfall to judging the attractiveness of a job. Making such judgments requires 
inferring a continuous criterion, for instance, job attractiveness, from a number of 
attributes of this object (i.e., the cues), such as the annual salary or the task demands. 
People may rely on two different types of judgment strategies: rule based and 
exemplar based (Erickson & Kruschke, 1998; Juslin et al., 2003; von Helversen & 
Rieskamp, 2008, 2009). 
Rule-based strategies assume that people form hypotheses about the 
relationship between the cues and the criterion and apply this knowledge to make a 
judgment (Brehmer, 1994; Juslin et al., 2008). Rule-based judgment strategies have 
been predominantly captured with linear, additive models (Cooksey, 1996) or cue 
abstraction models (Juslin et al., 2003). Linear models describe people’s judgments in 
a variety of tasks ranging from personal selection (Graves & Karren, 1992) to medical 
diagnoses (Wigton, 1996) and have been found to match people’s explicit judgment 
rules (Einhorn, Kleinmuntz, & Kleinmuntz, 1979; Lagnado, Newell, Kahan, & 
Shanks, 2006). Based on the lens model (Brunswik, 1956), linear models assume that 
people explicitly abstract a weight for each cue and then combine the weighted cue 
values additively (Einhorn et al., 1979, Juslin et al., 2003). For instance, when judging 
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the attractiveness of a job offer, people first determine how much they value salary 
and task demands. Then they weight the annual salary and task demands of the job by 
their importance and combine this knowledge by adding the weighted cue values. 
Exemplar-based judgment strategies, by contrast, rely on the retrieval of past 
experiences from long-term memory. Exemplar-based strategies assume that 
previously encountered objects are stored in memory along with their criterion values 
(Juslin et al., 2003, 2008). To judge the new object (the probe), all previously 
encountered objects (exemplars) and the associated criterion values are retrieved from 
memory. For instance, when judging the attractiveness of a new job, people may think 
about all past jobs they have held. The more similar a retrieved exemplar is to the 
probe, the more it influences the final judgment. Accordingly, previous jobs with task 
demands similar to the job offer influence the attractiveness rating more than unrelated 
work experiences. Thus, exemplar-based strategies imply that people store concrete 
instances without abstracting any knowledge and engage in an associative similarity-
based process during retrieval. 
In sum, rule-based and exemplar-based strategies differ in their assumptions 
about the cognitive processes underlying judgments (Hahn & Chater, 1998; Juslin et 
al., 2003). Whereas rule-based strategies use abstracted knowledge about the world to 
reason about new instances, similarity-based or exemplar-based strategies rely on 
similarity to past instances. Research suggests that people use both types of strategy, 
with strategy selection depending on task characteristics (Juslin et al., 2003, 2008; 
Karlsson, Juslin, & Olsson, 2007; Platzer & Bröder, 2013; von Helversen, Karlsson, 
Mata, & Wilke, 2013; von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2009) and individual differences 
(Mata, von Helversen, Karlsson, & Cüpper, 2012; von Helversen, Mata, & Olsson, 
2010): Specifically, when people perform the judgment task over trials and receive 
feedback about the correct criterion, they rely more on cue abstraction strategies if the 
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criterion is a linear additive function of the cues (in a “linear task”). However, people 
shift to exemplar-based strategies in “multiplicative tasks” where the judgment 
criterion is a nonlinear function of the cues (Hoffmann, von Helversen, & Rieskamp, 
2013; Juslin et al., 2008). This shift presumably takes place because the cue 
abstraction strategy does not allow accurate judgments in nonlinear environments 
(Juslin et al., 2008; von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2009). In the following section we 
review theoretical and empirical work on how the cognitive processes underlying rule-
based and exemplar-based strategies map onto different memory abilities. 
Linking Judgment Strategies and Memory Abilities 
In general, memory abilities can influence two aspects of strategy use: 
execution (i.e., the ability to execute a strategy correctly) and selection (Beach & 
Mitchell, 1978; Lemaire & Siegler, 1995; Mata, Pachur, et al., 2012). Regarding 
execution, better episodic memory can enhance exemplar retrieval and thus lead to 
more accurate exemplar-based judgments. Regarding selection, memory abilities can 
boost either the ability to choose the more accurate strategy or the preference for one 
strategy (Beach & Mitchell, 1978). We first address how executing rule-based and 
exemplar-based strategies is related to working memory, episodic memory, and 
implicit memory and thereafter address strategy selection. 
The Influence of Memory Abilities on Strategy Execution 
Rule-based strategies. Solving a rule-based categorization or judgment task 
has often been equated with logical reasoning (Ashby & O’Brien, 2005) or problem 
solving (Juslin et al., 2008). Like reasoning or problem solving, rule-based strategies 
are thought to involve a serial, controlled hypothesis-testing process and, in turn, 
working memory (Ashby & O’Brien, 2005; Brehmer, 1994; Juslin et al., 2003, 2008). 
Working memory may be required by two aspects of the rule-based process: rule 
abstraction and rule execution. 
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Rule abstraction requires learning the cue weight, the weight that should be 
given to a specific cue. To achieve this one could compare two successively presented 
objects, relate the difference in judgment criteria to the difference in cue values, and 
then update the cue weights (Juslin et al., 2008; Pachur & Olsson, 2012). It has been 
argued that this comparison process is inherently sequential and capacity constrained 
and—as a consequence—restricts people to abstract linear, additive rules (Juslin et al., 
2008). In addition, comparing two objects likely taxes working memory, because it 
involves storing information about the two judgment objects for a short time and 
manipulating this information, key functions of working memory (Atkinson & 
Shiffrin, 1968; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). Overall, recent research supports the idea 
that learning rules hinges on working memory. Learning one-dimensional 
categorization rules, for instance, is impaired by a concurrent verbal task (Filoteo, 
Lauritzen, & Maddox, 2010; Zeithamova & Maddox, 2006, 2007). In a similar vein, 
cognitive load studies suggest that people abandon cue abstraction strategies more 
frequently under cognitive load than without load (Hoffmann et al., 2013). Finally, 
learning a judgment task is easier if the sequence reduces working memory demands 
by facilitating a direct comparison of cue values and judgment criteria (Helsdingen, 
Van Gog, & Van Merriënboer, 2011; Juslin et al., 2008). 
Applying a learned rule may also involve working memory, such as mental 
updating and inhibition (Miyake et al., 2000; Oberauer, 2009). When making a 
judgment people may start with an initial estimate that is updated with each new piece 
of evidence (Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992; Juslin et al., 2008)—a process that requires 
keeping the past estimate in mind and manipulating it mentally. Furthermore, rule 
application requires inhibiting information, because people need to focus attention on 
the relevant cues and ignore the irrelevant ones. In line with this idea, Del Missier et 
al. (2013) found that correctly applying decision rules was related to working memory 
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capacity. Specifically, rule application involved inhibiting irrelevant information and 
updating information in working memory (Del Missier, Mäntylä, & Bruine de Bruin, 
2010, 2012). 
Long-term memory may be less important than working memory for making 
rule-based judgments. Once a rule has been established, only the cue weights need to 
be retrieved from long-term memory (Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin, 1956). Because 
previously encountered objects can be forgotten (von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2008), 
episodic memory should marginally influence rule execution.  
Exemplar-based strategies. Exemplar-based strategies assume that judgments 
are based on the similarity to previously encountered exemplars (Juslin et al., 2003; 
Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1988), suggesting that executing exemplar-based 
strategies should be linked to episodic memory (Hintzman, 1986, 1988; Nosofsky, 
1988). Two major processes in episodic memory may contribute to successfully 
adopting exemplar-based strategies: encoding into and retrieval from episodic memory 
(Estes, 1986; Shiffrin & Atkinson, 1969). 
Before any information can be recalled from memory, it is necessary to form a 
memory representation (i.e., to encode) and store this information (Estes, 1986). Like 
episodic trace models of episodic memory, for instance, MINERVA 2 (Hintzman, 
1984, 1986) or MINERVA-DM (Dougherty, Gettys, & Ogden, 1999), most exemplar-
based models assume that each presentation of an exemplar is stored as a separate 
memory trace (Estes, 1986; Nosofsky, 1988). Accordingly, the more often an object is 
presented, the more often it is encoded and the more likely is its subsequent retrieval. 
Likewise, elaboration, adding information to the memory trace, or spacing exemplar 
presentations across time intervals can deepen encoding (Brown & Craik, 2000; 
Martin, 1968). Beyond encoding, an exemplar-based strategy also requires accurately 
retrieving exemplars from episodic memory. Retrieval may fail because the probe’s 
Running Head: MEMORY AND JUDGMENT 11 
features—serving as retrieval cues—do not activate memory traces for stored 
exemplars or because past exemplars can no longer be discriminated (Medin & 
Schaffer, 1978). 
Although theoretical accounts suggest strong links between episodic memory 
and exemplar-based strategies, empirical evidence for the relationship is still scarce 
(Ashby & O’Brien, 2005). Nevertheless, researchers have shown that the instruction to 
learn all exemplars by heart helps learning in judgment tasks solvable by exemplar 
strategies (Olsson, Enkvist, & Juslin, 2006). If single exemplars have to be memorized 
to solve a categorization task, these exemplars are recognized more easily in a 
subsequent recognition test (Davis, Love, & Preston, 2012; Palmeri & Nosofsky, 
1995; Sakamoto & Love, 2004). In contrast, if people cannot identify past exemplars, 
they are less inclined to follow exemplar-based strategies (Rouder & Ratcliff, 2004). 
Furthermore, similar to spacing effects in memory (Cepeda, Pashler, Vul, Wixted, & 
Rohrer, 2006), spacing exemplar repetitions helps when solving exemplar-based tasks 
(McDaniel, Fadler, & Pashler, 2013). 
Neuropsychological work has challenged the view that similarity-based 
category learning depends solely on episodic memory (Knowlton, 1999; Smith, 2008). 
The multiple-systems view (Ashby & O’Brian, 2005; Smith & Grossman, 2008) 
proposes instead that implicit perceptual memory underlies categorizations based upon 
the similarity to one prototype. Amnesiac patients, for instance, classify new dot 
patterns with the same accuracy as healthy controls in prototype distortion tasks but 
are less accurate at recognizing previously encountered patterns (Knowlton & Squire, 
1993). It is possible that exemplar-based judgments might also rely on implicit 
perceptual memory. Although exemplar-based judgments require learning more than 
one exemplar to elicit different judgments, memory research indicates that more than 
one exemplar can be strengthened by past experience (Chiu, 2000; Musen & 
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Treisman, 1990). On the other hand, a single exemplar model can explain 
dissociations between categorization and recognition (Nosofsky & Zaki, 1998). 
Furthermore, even without previous training, healthy participants can achieve the 
same performance as trained amnesiac patients in prototype classification while 
showing chance recognition (Palmeri & Flanery, 1999). Thus, if implicit perceptual 
memory is related to exemplar-based judgments remains an open question (we discuss 
implicit procedural memory in the General Discussion). 
Working memory could also be involved in learning exemplar-based 
judgments. Lewandowsky (2011), for instance, argued that every recollection-based 
long-term memory task should be related to working memory capacity. Underpinning 
his argument, working memory has been found to support encoding and retrieval in 
episodic memory (Baddeley et al., 1984; Craik et al., 1996; Rosen & Engle, 1997; 
Unsworth et al., 2013). Exemplar retrieval may also involve a deliberative search in 
long-term memory (Juslin et al., 2008; Karlsson, Juslin, & Olsson, 2008). Indeed, 
research suggests that working memory load not only harms rule-based strategies but 
also disturbs retrieving past exemplars when judging new objects (Juslin et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, learning to solve rule-based and exemplar-based categorization tasks is 
facilitated by high working memory capacity (Craig & Lewandowsky, 2012; 
Lewandowsky, 2011; Lewandowsky, Yang, Newell, & Kalish, 2012). Therefore, 
working memory capacity should—in general—promote executing exemplar-based 
judgment strategies. However, if working memory promotes exemplar-based 
processing by enhancing episodic memory, episodic memory will serve as a mediator 
between working memory capacity and exemplar-based judgments, and hence, 
working memory capacity should lose importance for predicting exemplar-based 
judgments. 
The Influence of Memory on Strategy Selection 
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When choosing a strategy, people may learn the benefits and costs associated 
with each strategy (Beach & Mitchell, 1978; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993; 
Rieskamp, 2006; Rieskamp & Otto, 2006). Hence, memory abilities could determine 
the preference for employing a specific strategy. Thus, people with good episodic 
memory may select an exemplar-based strategy more often, whereas those with bad 
episodic memory may avoid that type of strategy. Along these lines, researchers have 
found that older adults avoid exemplar-based strategies—possibly because they place 
high demands on episodic memory (Mata, von Helversen et al., 2012). Similarly, high 
working memory capacity may facilitate using rules and thus encourage rule-based 
processing. 
There is also reason to believe that memory abilities differentially affect 
selecting a rule- or exemplar-based strategy. When learning to make judgments, 
people seem to start with a rule and switch to an exemplar-based strategy only if the 
rule fails (Juslin et al., 2008; Nosofsky, Palmeri, & McKinley, 1994). If rule-based 
strategies serve as a default option, memory abilities such as high working memory 
capacity may not be required to select such a strategy, only to execute it successfully. 
Memory abilities may influence the general ability to choose strategies 
adaptively (Mata, Pachur et al., 2012). Bröder (2003) found that intelligent 
participants were more likely to select a strategy that ignores information if this 
strategy performed well. People with higher working memory capacity do not simply 
prefer rule-based strategies in categorization; instead they seem to select the more 
appropriate strategy for the task at hand (Lewandowsky et al., 2012). People with high 
working memory capacity may not only apply rules more accurately but also be faster 
in detecting when rules cannot properly solve a judgment task, prompting a shift to 
exemplar-based strategies. 
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In contrast, some studies raised the possibility that working memory capacity is 
not involved in strategy selection. For instance, Craig and Lewandowsky (2012) found 
in a 5-4 categorization task that working memory capacity did not predict choice 
between one-dimensional rule-based strategies and exemplar-based strategies. 
Similarly, if the success rates of different strategies change over time, adaptation to 
these changes is not predicted by working memory capacity but by awareness of those 
changes (Schunn, Lovett, & Reder, 2001). These results suggest it is possible that 
neither the decision to store exemplars nor the decision to apply a rule hinges upon 
working memory capacity. 
Predictions for Judgment Performance and Strategy Selection 
To predict how memory abilities are related to judgment, it is necessary to 
consider the task. Judgment research suggests that people prefer rule-based strategies 
in linear tasks but switch to exemplar-based strategies in multiplicative tasks 
(Hoffmann et al., 2013; Juslin et al., 2008). Thus, memory abilities should 
differentially affect performance in linear and multiplicative tasks. 
Specifically, low working memory capacity should harm the execution of cue 
abstraction strategies, because incorrect cue weights are learned or because applying 
the rule is disrupted. In contrast, episodic memory should only marginally influence 
the execution of cue abstraction strategies above working memory. Consequently, 
higher working memory capacity but not better episodic memory should predict more 
accurate judgments in linear tasks. Successfully executing an exemplar-based strategy, 
in contrast, hinges on encoding into and retrieval from episodic memory so that better 
episodic memory—and possibly implicit perceptual memory—should improve 
judgment accuracy in multiplicative tasks. Working memory should not affect 
performance in a multiplicative task above episodic memory. Regarding strategy 
selection, working memory capacity may help people detect and choose the more 
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appropriate strategy. Episodic memory may make it more likely that people rely on 
retrieval of past exemplars in multiplicative tasks. 
The Present Study 
We examined how memory abilities relate to judgment performance in a linear, 
additive task and a multiplicative task. Additionally, we measured working memory, 
episodic memory, and implicit memory with three different tests each. We selected the 
memory tests so that variance stemming from material or task-specific effects was 
reduced, allowing us to measure relatively pure latent abilities (Miyake et al., 2000). 
These tests included different types of material (verbal, spatial, numeric) and different 
types of tasks (e.g., recognition, cued recall, and free recall for episodic memory). 
Participants 
 Two hundred and seventy-nine participants (147 female, 132 male, MAge = 24.0 
years, SDAge = 6.0) were recruited at the University of Basel. Participants received an 
hourly fee for their participation (CHF 20, approx. U.S. $22) and could earn an 
additional bonus in the judgment tasks (M = CHF 10.3, SD = 2.5). Overall, it took 
participants about 5 hr to complete the study, including a half-hour break. 
Automated Working Memory Span Tasks 
Working memory span tasks were designed to measure both storage and 
processing of information in working memory (Redick et al., 2012) by letting 
participants process one set of stimuli while remembering another set. For instance, in 
each trial of the operation span task, participants first see a simple equation. After they 
solve the equation and give the answer, they see the first letter that has to be 
remembered. Subsequently, a second equation is presented and solved and then the 
next letter that has to be remembered is presented. Solving of equations and 
presentation of letters continues until a certain number of letters (the set size) has been 
presented. At the end of each trial, participants have to recall the letters in order of 
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their appearance. Trials with different set sizes are randomly interspersed, with each 
set size repeated three times. 
We used three well-known span tasks (Unsworth, McMillan, Brewer, & 
Spillers, 2012; Unsworth, Redick, Heitz, Broadway, & Engle, 2009): the reading, 
the operation, and the symmetry span. The tasks were taken from Unsworth et al. 
(2009) and translated into German. We measured working memory capacity using the 
partial credit score (the sum of all items recalled in the correct position over all trials) 
as the dependent variable (Conway et al., 2005). 
Operation span. Participants were asked to solve equations while 
remembering letters. Set size varied from 3 to 7 so that partial credit scores could 
range from 0 to 75. 
Reading span. In the reading span participants judged the plausibility of a 
sentence while remembering letters.1 Set size varied from 3 to 7 so that partial credit 
scores could range from 0 to 75. 
Symmetry span. Participants judged the symmetry of a chessboard picture 
while remembering the positions of squares in a 4 × 4 matrix. In each trial, participants 
first saw a chessboard picture and were asked to judge its symmetry. Afterward, one 
square in the 4 × 4 matrix was highlighted and participants were asked to remember its 
position. After the set size had been reached, participants recalled the positions of the 
squares by clicking on the squares in order of their appearance. Set size varied from 2 
to 5 so that partial credit scores could range from 0 to 42. 
Episodic Memory Tasks 
We measured episodic memory with three tasks: free recall of pictures, cued 
recall of numbers, and recognition of verbs. 
Picture free recall. We selected 20 pictures with high ratings on imagery and 
concreteness from a picture database (Rossion & Pourtois, 2004). Each picture was 
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presented for 3 s and participants had to remember them. After a 2-min retention 
interval participants recalled the pictures by naming them. Performance was measured 
as the percentage of correctly recalled pictures. 
Cued number recall. We assessed cued number recall with a computerized 
version of the cued number recall task from the Berliner Intelligenzstruktur-Test Form 
4 (BIS 4; Jäger, Süß, & Beauducel, 1997). Fifteen pairs of a two- and a three-digit 
number were first presented for 10 s each. After a 2-min retention interval, participants 
saw the cued number pair as well as 4 three-digit number distractors and had to 
indicate which three-digit number was initially presented together with the two-digit 
number. Performance was measured as the percentage of correctly recalled three-digit 
numbers. 
Verb recognition. We selected 40 verbs with five to seven letters that were 
rated high on imagery and concreteness from the Hager and Hasselhorn (1994) 
database. Twenty verbs were assigned to a list of old items and 20 to a list of new 
items with the lists matched on word length, imagery, and concreteness. In the study 
phase, participants learned the old verbs for 3 s each. After a retention interval of 2 
min, participants indicated whether they recognized the 40 verbs from the study phase 
by classifying them as old or new. Performance was measured as the percentage of 
verbs correctly classified as old or new. 
Implicit Perceptual Memory Tasks 
Researchers have questioned the reliability of implicit memory measures 
(Buchner & Brandt, 2003; Buchner & Wippich, 2000; Meier & Perrig, 2000). To 
increase reliability, we used performance tests that always had a correct solution 
(instead of association tests such as word stem completion; Buchner & Brandt, 2003). 
Our participants solved three implicit perceptual memory tests: speeded presentation 
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of line drawings, identification of sounds presented in noise, and identification of 
degraded nouns. 
We measured performance as the difference in median reaction times between 
old and new items, including correct and incorrect answers. Negative reaction time 
differences indicate that participants responded faster to old items than to new items, 
showing an implicit memory effect, a facilitation because of prior experience. 
Speeded presentation of line drawings. We based our speeded presentation 
task on an experiment by Musen and Treisman (1990). We randomly created 500 line 
drawings, from which we excluded duplicates and simple forms, such as arrows. For 
the implicit memory test, we randomly selected 40 line drawings—20 old and 20 
new—with the restriction to have at most two lines in common. To determine the 
presentation threshold we used 40 line drawings that differed from the drawings in the 
implicit memory test in at least two lines. 
Using a threshold procedure we first determined the presentation length at 
which participants could correctly reproduce half of the line drawings. Starting with a 
presentation length of 400 frames (approx. 1200 ms), participants were asked to 
retrace the line drawing on a mask composed of all possible lines. Participants were 
required to draw all five lines and told to guess if they could not remember a line. 
Presentation length decreased by 100 frames (300 ms) after each correct reproduction 
and increased by 100 frames after each incorrect one. Step size decreased 10 frames 
(30 ms) after five turning points (turning point refers to a switch between decreases 
and increases in presentation length). 
In the subsequent study phase, participants had to click as fast as possible on 
all lines of the 20 old items. Participants retraced all old items twice. After a 2-min 
retention interval, participants again completed a speeded reproduction task. The 
presentation length was set to the presentation length at the end of the threshold 
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procedure. Participants had to redraw the briefly presented old and new line drawings. 
Performance was measured as the difference in median reaction times between old and 
new line drawings. 
Identification of degraded nouns. Forty 5- to 7-letter nouns with high 
imagery and concreteness were selected from the Hager and Hasselhorn (1994) 
database. Nouns highly similar in spelling were excluded. The nouns were 
alphabetically sorted and 20 items with the same initials were randomly included in 
the old and new item list. To present the nouns in a degraded fashion, we 
superimposed an 8 × 2 chessboard mask over each noun. Nine of the 16 squares were 
randomly turned black to render noun identification difficult.2 
In the study phase, participants had to count the vowels in 20 nouns, with 
German umlauts counting as two vowels. Each noun was presented for 3 s on screen. 
After a 2-min retention interval, participants were asked to correctly identify 40 
degraded nouns by typing in the noun names and confirming their response by 
pressing “Enter.” Half of the nouns were old (i.e., had already been presented in the 
study phase). Performance was measured as the difference in median reaction times 
between old and new degraded nouns with reaction time operationalized as time to last 
key press. 
Sound identification in noise. We selected 40 sounds from the Database for 
Environmental Sound Research and Application (Gygi & Shafiro, 2010) with a length 
between 0.55 and 3.54 s. All sounds were equalized for RMS (root mean squared) 
loudness, so that mean RMS loudness was 60 dB. The median spectral centroid—a 
measure of central tendency that characterizes the frequency spectrum and is 
correlated with subjective brightness of a sound (Schubert & Wolfe, 2006)—ranged 
from 262 to 5,507 Hz. For the sound identification task, the sounds were embedded in 
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5 s of white noise with a signal-to-noise ratio of -15 dB. Each sound started 0.5 s after 
stimulus onset. 
In the study phase, participants were asked to indicate whether the 20 old 
sounds had a higher or lower pitch than their own voice. After a 2-min retention 
interval, participants listened to 20 old sounds from the study phase and 20 new 
sounds, all embedded in noise.3 After each sound, participants were shown the name 
of the sound as well as the names of two other sounds that never appeared in the study 
and had to indicate which of the sounds they had listened to. Performance was 
measured as the difference in median reaction times between old and new sounds. 
Judgment Tasks 
Participants solved both a linear and a multiplicative task, taken from 
Hoffmann, von Helversen, and Rieskamp (2014). In both tasks, participants had to 
judge a continuous criterion ranging from 0 to 50 based on four cues varying on a 
continuous scale from 0 to 5. In the linear task, the criterion y was a linear, additive 
function of the cues: 
, (1) 
where c1 reflects the most important cue according to its cue weight. Each cue value 
varied between 0 and 5. In the multiplicative task the function included a 
multiplicative combination of the cues: 
 (2) 
We used two different cover stories for the linear and the multiplicative task. In 
the linear task, participants judged whether a comic figure was a good or bad catcher 
of small creatures. In the multiplicative task, participants estimated the toxicity of a 
bug. The stimuli consisted of pictures of either bugs or comic figures. These bugs and 
comic figures varied on four cues. The bugs varied on the length of their legs, their 
€ 
y = 4c1 + 3c2 + 2c3 +c4
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antennae, and their wings, and the number of spots on their back. The comic figures 
had different sizes of ears and nose and a different number of hairs and stripes on their 
shirt.   
From all possible items, we selected a subset for the training and the validation 
set (see Hoffmann et al., 2014): The training set was used in the training phase to 
allow participants to learn how to solve the tasks. The validation set was employed in 
the test phase to identify the judgment strategy that described participants best. The 
cue values were sampled from a uniform distribution for each cue. In the linear task, a 
linear rule-based judgment strategy made more accurate predictions for validation 
items and should, consequently, lead to a better performance than an exemplar-based 
strategy in the test phase; in the multiplicative task, however, an exemplar-based 
strategy not only fitted the training set better than a linear rule-based judgment 
strategy but also made more accurate predictions for validation items. Hence, an 
exemplar-based strategy should lead to a better performance in the multiplicative task. 
Additionally, the rule-based and the exemplar-based strategy predicted different 
responses on the validation items. Correlations between the cues were low in the 
training set, ranging from r = -.17 to r = .11. 
Table 1 illustrates the task structure: The cues c1 to c4 could be used to predict 
the correct criterion value. These cues were randomly assigned to the pictorial cues 
(e.g., ears or nose). Higher cue values, however, were always associated with more 
salient pictorial features. For instance, a cue value of zero corresponded to a bug 
without spots on the back and a cue value of five to a bug with five spots on its back. 
Both tasks consisted of a training and a test phase. During training, participants 
learned to estimate the criterion values for 25 items from the training set. In each trial, 
participants first saw a picture of a bug or a comic figure and were asked to estimate 
its criterion value. Afterward they received feedback about the correct value, their own 
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estimate, and the points they had earned. Training ended after 10 training blocks, each 
consisting of the 25 training items presented in a random sequence. In the subsequent 
test phase, participants judged 15 new validation items four times but received no 
performance feedback. 
To motivate participants, they could earn points in every trial. The number of 
points they earned was a truncated quadratic function of the deviation of their 
judgment j from the criterion y: 
 (3) 
At the end of the judgment tasks, the points earned were converted to a 
monetary bonus (1,500 points = CHF 1). In addition, participants earned a bonus of 
CHF 3 if they reached 80% of the points in the last training block (corresponding to a 
root mean square deviation [RMSD] of less than 5.5 in both judgment tasks). 
Filler Tasks 
The six mostly attention-based filler tasks used during the retention intervals of 
the memory tests were selected so that they included neither the same type of stimulus 
material (verbal, numerical, etc.) nor the same items as the memory test. All filler 
tasks were paper-and-pencil tests. We used the d2 test (Brickenkamp, 2002), the 
underline “x,” the letter series, the mark numbers divisible by 7, and the number-
symbol task from the BIS 4 (Jäger et al., 1997), as well as the letter sets task from the 
Kit of Factor-Referenced Cognitive Tests (KIT; Ekstrom, French, Harman, & Dermen, 
1976). In the d2 test, for instance, participants are asked to cross out all ds with two 
small dashes while ignoring all ps or ds with more (or fewer) dashes. 
Procedure 
Participants solved all tasks on one day with a half-hour break between the two 
sessions. The tasks were presented in the same order to each participant. In the first 
€ 
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session, participants first solved the linear judgment task. Afterward, they solved the 
operation span, the verb recognition (filler: number-symbol test), the sound 
identification in noise (filler: letter series), the picture free recall (filler: underline x), 
and finally completed the symmetry span. 
The second session started with the multiplicative judgment task. Afterward, 
participants completed the reading span, the degraded identification of nouns (filler: 
mark numbers divisible by 7), the cued number recall task (filler: d2 test), and the 
speeded presentation of line drawings (filler: letter sets). 
Results 
First, we analyzed participants’ average performance in the memory and 
judgment tasks (see Table 2 for descriptive statistics) and modeled participants’ 
judgment strategies. Second, we fitted a measurement model to memory abilities and 
judgment performance separately. Next, we linked these two measurement models, 
estimating a structural model that predicts judgment accuracy by memory abilities. 
Finally, we investigated how strategy execution and strategy selection in the judgment 
tasks influences the relationship between memory and judgment accuracy. 
Performance Measures 
Performance in the memory tasks. Performance in the working memory span 
tasks was comparable to normative data (Redick et al., 2012). Participants achieved a 
higher partial credit score in the operation and the reading span than in the symmetry 
span, indicating that they recalled more items in these tasks. In the episodic memory 
tasks, participants showed a higher recall rate for recognition than for free recall or 
cued recall. In the implicit memory tasks, participants showed, on average, a higher 
implicit memory effect in degraded presentation than in identification in noise or 
speeded presentation. In speeded presentation, participants did not respond faster to 
the old items at all. 
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Performance in the judgment tasks. First, we assessed how well participants 
learned to solve the judgment tasks. As an indicator of performance, we calculated the 
RMSD between participants’ judgments in the last training block and the correct 
criterion, with lower RMSDs indicating higher accuracy. We used Wilcoxon z tests to 
compare performance in the judgment tasks, because judgments slightly deviated from 
normality. 
Overall, participants successfully learned to solve the judgment tasks. 
However, more participants earned a bonus in the multiplicative task (81% of the 
participants) than in the linear task, 52% of the participants, χ2(1) = 7.56, p = .006. 
Replicating previous results showing that participants learn to solve multiplicative 
tasks more accurately than linear tasks (von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2008), 
participants judged the training items on average more accurately in the multiplicative 
than in the linear task, Wilcoxon z = 4.92, p < .001. 
Next, we investigated how well people generalized their performance to 
validation items in the test phase. Performance for validation items was measured as 
the RSMD between the correct criterion and participants’ mean judgment, that is, the 
judgment for each item averaged over the four presentations. Performance in test was 
comparable between the linear and the multiplicative task (Wilcoxon z = 1.46, p = 
.145). 
Modeling of Judgment Strategies 
To investigate which strategy participants relied on, we adopted a cognitive 
modeling approach. For each participant, we fitted a linear regression model 
(describing the rule-based strategy), an exemplar model (describing an exemplar-
based strategy), and a baseline model (estimating participants’ mean judgments) to 
participants’ judgments in the last three training blocks and predicted participants’ 
mean judgments for validation items by using the fitted parameter estimates (von 
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Helversen & Rieskamp, 2008). This test of predictive fit accounts for model 
complexity not only in terms of the number of free parameters but also in terms of 
their functional form (Busemeyer & Wang, 2000). 
Linear model. In linear regression models, used to mathematically describe 
rule-based judgment strategies, the importance of each cue is reflected in its cue 
weight; the higher the cue weights are, the more they influence the judgment. The 
criterion estimate cˆp,Linear  of an object p is the weighted sum of the cue values xpi: 
cˆp,Linear = k + wi ⋅ xpi
i=1
I
∑  (4) 
where wi are the cue weights for each cue i and k is a constant intercept. 
Exemplar model. To describe the exemplar-based strategy mathematically we 
used an exemplar model with one free sensitivity parameter (Juslin et al., 2003).4 In 
exemplar models, the similarity S(p,j) between probe p and exemplar j is an 
exponential function of the objects’ distance dpj (Nosofsky & Zaki, 1998): 
S p, j( ) = e−dpj . (5) 
This distance is determined by summing up the absolute differences between 
the cue values xpi of the probe and the cue values xji of the exemplar on each cue i and 
then weighting this sum by the sensitivity parameter h. 
. (6) 
Correspondingly, the more closely the cue values of the probe and the 
exemplar match, the smaller the distance is between the objects. The sensitivity 
parameter expresses how strongly people discriminate among the stored exemplars. A 
sensitivity parameter close to 0 indicates no discrimination; a high parameter indicates 
that people specifically remember each exemplar. 
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The criterion estimate cˆp,Exemplar  is then determined as the average sum of the 











implying that the judgment of a new probe relies upon a similarity-based retrieval of 
the criterion values associated with each exemplar. 
Model fits. We measured model fit as the RMSD between model predictions 
and participants’ judgments in the training phase and participants’ mean judgments in 
the test phase, respectively (see Table 3 for fit indices during training and test). A 
model that perfectly describes participants’ judgments would yield an RMSD of 0, 
whereas a model that, for instance, always overestimates participants’ judgments by 9 
points would have an RMSD of 9. To compare model fits, we used Wilcoxon signed-
rank tests because the RMSDs were not normally distributed. 
At the end of training, the baseline model did not provide a good description of 
participants’ judgments in the linear or multiplicative task. The baseline model did 
worse than the linear and the exemplar model for participants’ judgments in the linear 
task (linear model: z = 14.5, p < .001; exemplar model: z = 14.3, p < .001) and in the 
multiplicative task (linear model: z = 14.5, p < .001; exemplar model: z = 14.2, p < 
.001). The linear model described participants’ judgments overall better than the 
exemplar model (z = 14.5, p < .001) in the linear task, but it did not outperform the 
exemplar model in the multiplicative task (z = 1.5, p = .145). 
In the test phase, the linear model also accounted for participants’ judgments 
better than the exemplar model in the linear task (z = 11.2, p < .001). In the 
multiplicative task, the exemplar model predicted participants’ judgments slightly 
more accurately than the linear model (z = 4.8, p < .001). Replicating results from 
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training, the baseline model described participants’ judgments worse than the linear 
model or the exemplar model in the linear task (linear model: z = 14.1, p < .001; 
exemplar model: z = 14.2, p < .001) and the multiplicative task (linear model: z = 14.0, 
p < .001; exemplar model: z = 14.0, p < .001). 
Strategy classification. To further examine individual differences in strategy 
selection, we classified participants as selecting the strategy that led to the smallest 
RMSD between model predictions and participants’ mean judgments. As shown in 
Figure 1, most participants adapted their strategy to the task. Whereas in the linear 
task the majority of participants were best described by the linear model (nLinear = 220, 
nExemplar = 42, nBaseline = 17), in the multiplicative task most participants were classified 
as following an exemplar model, nLinear = 99, nExemplar = 176, nBaseline = 4, χ2(2) = 
136.31, p = .001. Indeed, half of the participants (50.2%) were best described by the 
linear model in the linear task but best described by the exemplar model in the 
multiplicative task. 
To capture how much participants relied on a cue abstraction or an exemplar-
based strategy, we also fitted a strategy weight parameter ws to participants’ judgments 
in the test phase, excluding participants best described by the baseline model 
(Hoffmann et al., 2013). Using the optimal parameters for the linear and the exemplar 
model from the training phase, we estimated the strategy weight by minimizing the 
RMSD between the models’ weighted predictions  and participants’ mean 
judgments in the test phase: 
€ 
ˆ c p = ws⋅ ˆ c p, Exemplar + (1− ws)⋅ ˆ c p, Linear. (8) 
Accordingly, the strategy weight weights the predictions of the exemplar 
model  and the linear model  for the test phase and depends upon only 
the relative predictive performance of the models. This strategy weight serves as a 
cˆp
cˆp,Exemplar cˆp,Linear
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measurement tool and can take values between 0 and 1 (see Table 2 for descriptive 
statistics). A strategy weight above .5 indicates a higher probability for the exemplar 
model, a strategy weight below .5 a higher probability for the linear model. In the 
linear task, the strategy weight was on average below .5 (one-sample Wilcoxon test: z 
= 11.3, p < .001), whereas it was larger than .5 in the multiplicative task (one-sample 
Wilcoxon test: z = -3.9, p < .001). 
Overall, our results underscore that judgment processes were highly task 
sensitive (Juslin et al., 2008; Karlsson et al., 2007). Most participants were best 
described by a rule-based linear judgment strategy in the linear task and by an 
exemplar-based strategy in the multiplicative task. 
Structural Equation Modeling 
To understand how judgment performance is grounded in memory abilities, we 
used structural equation modeling. This approach is particularly strong because it 
allows testing theories about relations between theoretically well-defined latent 
constructs extracted from manifest indicators (Hayduk, Cummings, Boadu, 
Pazderka-Robinson, & Boulianne, 2007). In doing so, structural equation modeling 
estimates the variance shared among the indicators, correcting the construct for task-
specific variance (DeShon, 1998; Tomarken & Waller, 2005). Anderson and Gerbing 
(1988) recommended first estimating the measurement model that relates the manifest 
indicators to the latent constructs and then testing the relations between the constructs 
based on theoretical assumptions. 
Model fit is often evaluated based on several fit indices (Iacobucci, 2010; 
Kline, 2011), among them chi-square (χ2), the standardized root mean square residual 
(SRMR), the comparative fit index (CFI), and the root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA). The factor rho coefficient ρˆXiXi  was used to assess the 
reliability of the constructs (Kline, 2011; Raykov, 2004). To evaluate how the 
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constructs are related to each other, we compared the hypothesized model to nested 
competitors by computing χ2 difference tests; non-nested models were compared on 
the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). The software package MPLUS (Muthén & 
Muthén, 2010) was used to estimate the models. Because descriptive data indicated 
deviations from multivariate normality, we estimated all models using a maximum 
likelihood estimator with robust standard errors (MLR) and Satorra–Bentler scaled χ2 
values (scaling factor, SF) for χ2 difference tests (Satorra & Bentler, 2001). 
Measurement model for memory abilities. To establish construct validity, 
we first estimated a measurement model for memory abilities. We hypothesized that 
working memory, episodic memory, and implicit perceptual memory constitute three 
separate constructs, each described by three tests (episodic memory: recognition, free 
and cued recall; working memory: operation, reading, and symmetry span; implicit 
perceptual memory: degraded presentation, speeded presentation, and identification in 
noise). Working memory and episodic memory are typically positively correlated 
(Brewer & Unsworth, 2012); implicit memory should be uncorrelated with episodic 
memory (Bruss & Mitchell, 2009) and probably also with working memory. 
Table 4 depicts the zero-order correlations between all memory and judgment 
tasks. Overall, the working memory measures were moderately correlated. Likewise, 
the episodic memory measures showed small, positive correlations to each other. 
However, two of three correlations between the implicit memory measures were not 
different from 0, resulting in an empirically under-identified measurement model for 
implicit memory. Therefore, we excluded the implicit memory measures from all 
further analyses, reducing the hypothesized measurement model to two latent factors: 
working memory and episodic memory. 
 Indeed, as illustrated in Figure 2, a two-factor latent-variable model assuming 
that working memory and episodic memory are correlated provided the best fit, χ2(8) 
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= 14.06, SF = 1.00, p = .080, CFI = .96, RMSEA = .05, SRMR = .04. Omitting the 
correlation between working memory and episodic memory decreased model fit, χ2(9) 
= 21.14, SF = 1.06, p = .012, CFI = .93, RMSEA = .07, SRMR = .07, Δχ2(1) = 5.42, p 
= .020. Likewise, assuming only one latent factor for all six memory tasks decreased 
model fit, χ2(9) = 37.32, SF = 0.95, p < .001, CFI = .83, RMSEA = .11, SRMR = .06, 
Δχ2(1) = 38.90, p < .001. Construct reliabilities in the best fitting model were 
moderately high for working memory ( ρˆXiXi  = .72) and acceptable for episodic 
memory ( ρˆXiXi  = .38), considering that episodic memory was assessed with different 
types of material and tests. Overall, these results replicate one key finding from 
previous individual difference studies: Working memory and episodic memory are 
moderately correlated (Brewer & Unsworth, 2012; Del Missier et al., 2013; Unsworth, 
2010). 
Measurement model for judgment performance. The measurement model 
for judgment performance was particularly interesting because—to our knowledge—
whether performance in linear and multiplicative tasks is task specific or depends on a 
more general ability to learn judgments has not been investigated. To measure 
performance in both tasks, we used the RMSD between participants’ judgments and 
the correct criterion in each of the four test blocks of the two tasks (see Table 4 for 
zero-order correlations). Performance in the linear task was assumed to constitute one 
latent factor and performance in the multiplicative task a second. We then compared 
three measurement models against each other, assuming that the latent factors are (a) 
uncorrelated, (b) correlated, or (c) identical; that is, performance over all test blocks in 
the linear and the multiplicative task can be described by one factor. 
As illustrated in Figure 3, a model that assumed a correlation between 
performances in the linear and multiplicative tasks provided the best fit, χ2(19) = 
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21.87, SF = 1.23, p = .291, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .02, SRMR = .03, suggesting two 
moderately correlated latent factors. Construct reliability was high for performance in 
both the linear task ( ρˆXiXi  = .92) and the multiplicative task ( ρˆXiXi  = .90). Omitting the 
correlation between the latent factors did not harm model fit with regard to CFI (0.99) 
and RMSEA (.05). However, the other two fit criteria yielded a different picture, 
χ2(20) = 33.84, SF = 1.24, p = .027, SRMR = .11, Δχ2(1) = 10.29, p = .001. A model 
that assumed a single latent factor was rejected by all fit criteria, χ2(20) = 571.79, SF = 
1.15, p < .001, CFI = 0.53, RMSEA = .31, SRMR = .23. 
The small correlation in accuracy between the linear and the multiplicative task 
yields some evidence that individual differences in judgment performance partly stem 
from a general ability to solve judgment problems. However, many of the individual 
differences in accuracy were peculiar to the multiplicative or the linear task, 
suggesting that distinct processes may account for individual differences in judgment 
performance. 
Predicting Judgment Performance With Memory Abilities 
Do individual differences in memory abilities determine how well people solve 
different judgment tasks? We predicted that participants with higher working memory 
capacity would make more accurate judgments in the linear task, whereas those with 
better episodic memory would solve multiplicative tasks more accurately. To test this 
hypothesis against competing ideas, we combined the measurement model for memory 
abilities with that for judgment performance into one structural model that assumes a 
path from working memory to judgment performance in the linear task and a path 
from episodic memory to judgment performance in the multiplicative task. We 
compared this model to two alternative models: (1) a null model that assumes memory 
abilities do not predict judgment performance at all and (2) a full model that 
Running Head: MEMORY AND JUDGMENT 32 
additionally assumes working memory predicts performance in multiplicative tasks 
and episodic memory predicts performance in linear tasks. 
The hypothesized structural model captured the underlying covariance 
structure very well, χ2(73) = 67.40, SF = 1.04, p = .663, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00, 
SRMR = .04, and better than the two alternative models: Assuming no relationship 
between memory abilities and judgment performance decreased model fit 
considerably, χ2(75) = 105.10, SF = 1.05, p = .012, CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = .04, SRMR 
= .10, Δχ2(2) = 34.31, p < .001. Indeed, omitting the path from working memory to 
judgment performance in the linear task decreased model fit, χ2(74) = 89.78, SF = 
1.05, p = .102, CFI = 0.99, RMSEA = .03, SRMR = .08, Δχ2(1) = 16.84, p < .001. 
Likewise, omitting the path from episodic memory to judgment performance in the 
multiplicative task decreased model fit, χ2(74) = 86.89, SF = 1.04. p = .145, CFI = 
0.99, RMSEA = .03, SRMR = .07, Δχ2(1) = 19.50, p < .001. Finally, the full model 
that assumed working memory and episodic memory are both important for predicting 
judgment performance in the linear and the multiplicative task did not outperform the 
hypothesized model, χ2(71) = 63.76, SF = 1.04, p = .72, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00, 
SRMR = .03, Δχ2(2) = 3.52, p = .172. 
In line with our hypothesis, the resulting structural model (Figure 4) shows that 
people with higher working memory capacity solved linear tasks more accurately than 
people with lower working memory capacity, whereas people with better episodic 
memory solved multiplicative tasks better than those with bad episodic memory.5 We 
next investigated if memory abilities also influence strategy selection. 
Tracing the Path From Memory Abilities to Judgment Performance Through 
Judgment Strategies  
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Strategy selection. In the Introduction we outlined that memory abilities may 
change strategy selection in two ways. Working memory may make it more likely that 
people quickly detect the task-appropriate judgment strategy; accordingly, working 
memory should predict strategy selection in the linear and the multiplicative task, and 
strategy selection, in turn, should predict judgment accuracy. Yet it is possible that 
people with better episodic memory rely more on their capabilities and select 
exemplar-based strategies more often in the multiplicative task. Accordingly, episodic 
memory should predict strategy selection in the multiplicative task and, in turn, 
judgment accuracy. 
To investigate how memory abilities affect strategy selection and judgment 
accuracy, we relied on mediation analyses. If memory abilities influence judgment 
accuracy by altering the strategy, then strategy selection should mediate the 
relationship between memory abilities and judgment performance. We compared a 
null model that assumed strategy selection does not mediate the relationship between 
memory abilities and judgment accuracy against different mediator models. 
Alternative models proposed that strategy selection mediates the relationship (a) 
between episodic memory and performance only in the multiplicative task, (b) 
between working memory and performance in the linear task, or (c) between working 
memory and performance in the multiplicative task. 
To conduct these analyses, we used the continuous strategy weight ws as the 
mediator (Equation 8). Because the strategy weight indicates only how much 
participants relied on an exemplar-based strategy or a rule-based strategy, participants 
classified as following a baseline model in the linear or the multiplicative task were 
coded as missing on that variable. To avoid excluding all their data, we used a full 
information maximum likelihood approach to estimate the structural model (Tomarken 
& Waller, 2005). 
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Overall, the best fitting structural model assumed that episodic memory 
predicts strategy selection in the multiplicative task and this choice, in turn, influences 
judgment accuracy in the multiplicative task, χ2(100) = 94.94, SF = 1.03, p = .624, 
CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00, SRMR = .05, BIC = 13,928. This model fit significantly 
better than a model that did not assume a path from memory abilities to strategy 
selection or from strategy selection to judgment performance, χ2(102) = 186.60, SF = 
1.04, p < .001, CFI = .95, RMSEA = .06, SRMR = .10, BIC = 14,012, Δχ2(2) = 83.75, 
p < .001. Model fit was also improved by assuming that working memory predicts 
strategy selection in the multiplicative task, χ2(100) = 99.45, SF = 1.03, p = .497, CFI 
= 1.00, RMSEA = .00, SRMR = .05, BIC = 13,933, Δχ2(2) = 79.64, p < .001. 
However, this model yields a higher BIC than the model that predicts strategy 
selection in the multiplicative task with episodic memory, ΔBIC = 5, suggesting that 
episodic memory predicts strategy selection in the multiplicative task slightly better 
than working memory. Considering both predictors simultaneously also did not 
increase model fit, χ2(99) = 93.78, SF = 1.03, p = .629, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00, 
SRMR = .04, Δχ2(1) = 1.17, p = .280. Model fit was not improved by assuming that 
strategy selection mediates the relationship between working memory and judgment 
accuracy in the linear task, χ2(100) = 182.30, SF = 1.03, p < .001, CFI = 0.95, 
RMSEA = .05, SRMR = .09, BIC = 14,019, Δχ2(2) = 4.27, p = .118.6  
As illustrated in Figure 5, the best fitting structural model shows that strategy 
selection partly mediated the relationship between episodic memory and judgment 
performance in the multiplicative task. People with better episodic memory were more 
likely to select an exemplar-based strategy in the multiplicative task, and this strategy 
change increased judgment accuracy in the multiplicative task (r = -.16 for the indirect 
effect, p < .001). Better episodic memory still predicted higher judgment accuracy, but 
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the standardized regression weight dropped from r = -.43 to r = -.27 when the strategy 
weight in the multiplicative task (called “strategy” in the structural model) was added. 
In contrast, higher working memory capacity did not increase the probability of 
selecting a rule-based strategy in the linear task and strategy selection did not affect 
judgment performance in the linear task. 
Strategy execution. In the Introduction we argued that memory abilities may 
predict judgment performance because memory abilities improve strategy execution. 
Specifically, high working memory capacity may help people execute rule-based 
strategies, and in turn, strategy execution may mediate the relationship between 
working memory capacity and judgment accuracy in the linear task. In contrast, 
episodic memory may help people execute exemplar-based strategies, and in turn, 
strategy execution may mediate the relationship between episodic memory and 
judgment accuracy in the multiplicative task. To further test these hypotheses, we 
examined how strategy execution contributes to the relationship between memory and 
judgment. As an indicator for strategy execution in the linear and the multiplicative 
task, we used the model fit resulting from the estimation of the strategy weight 
(Equation 8) that is the minimal RMSD between the weighted model predictions  
and participants’ mean judgments in the test phase. If the strategy weight is 0, the 
strategy execution measure equates to the predictive fit of the linear model; if the 
strategy weight is 0.5, it reflects the combined fit of both models. Consequently, the 
strategy execution measure determines how consistently people transfer the strategy 
learned in training to validation items in test given the strategy weight. 
To understand how strategy execution is related to memory and judgment 
accuracy, we again conducted mediation analyses. Matching the analysis for strategy 
selection, we estimated a null model that assumed strategy execution does not mediate 
the relationship between memory abilities and judgment accuracy. We compared this 
cˆp
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model to different competitors that assumed strategy execution mediates the 
relationship between (a) working memory and performance only in the linear task, or 
(b) episodic memory and performance only in the multiplicative task. 
In the best fitting structural model, strategy execution mediated the relationship 
between working memory and judgment accuracy in the linear task, χ2(100) = 102.57, 
SF = 1.05, p = .410, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .01, SRMR = .04, BIC = 15,249. 
According to this model, working memory predicts strategy execution in the linear 
task; hence, the more closely participants followed the strategy learned in training, the 
more accurate were their judgments. Comparing this model to the null model and thus 
discarding the indirect effect of strategy execution in the linear task significantly 
harmed the fit of the structural model, χ2(102) = 208.13, SF = 1.05, p < .001, CFI = 
.94, RMSEA = .06, SRMR = .10, Δχ2(2) = 105.56, p < .001, BIC = 15,349. A 
structural model assuming that strategy execution mediates the relationship between 
episodic memory and accuracy in the multiplicative task did not improve model fit 
compared to the null model, χ2(100) = 202.69, SF = 1.05, p < .001, CFI = 0.94, 
RMSEA = .06, SRMR = .10, Δχ2(2) = 5.26, p = .072, BIC = 15,356. Likewise, this 
model yields a higher BIC than the model predicting strategy execution with working 
memory in the linear task, ΔBIC = 107.7 
Figure 6 shows the resulting structural model. In this model, working memory 
capacity again directly predicts judgment accuracy in the linear task, but to a smaller 
extent (the standardized regression weight fell from r = -.35 to r = -.24). Strategy 
execution mediates this relationship between working memory and judgment 
accuracy. Higher working memory capacity facilitates executing the learned strategy 
in linear tasks, and strategy execution, in turn, predicts how accurately people make 
judgments in linear tasks (r = -.11 for the indirect effect, p = .019). In the 
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multiplicative task, however, episodic memory does not predict how well people 
execute a learned strategy, and strategy execution does not lead to more accurate 
judgments. 
General Discussion 
Working memory and long-term memory are indispensable for many everyday 
activities. In fact, working memory capacity predicts performance in a wide range of 
cognitive tasks ranging from reading (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980) to reasoning 
(Kane et al., 2004; Kyllonen & Christal, 1990) and also predicts everyday cognitive 
failures (Unsworth et al., 2012). Likewise, episodic memory has proven useful as an 
indicator of general intelligence (Jäger et al., 1997). However, little attention has been 
paid to how various memory abilities influence judgment and decision making (Ashby 
& O’Brien, 2005; Del Missier et al., 2013; Tomlinson et al., 2011). We sought to fill 
this gap by investigating how working memory and episodic memory promote 
judgment strategies and performance in two judgment tasks: a linear task that can best 
be solved by a rule-based cue abstraction strategy and a multiplicative task in which 
people should rely more often on an exemplar-based strategy. As predicted, we found 
that working memory capacity was linked to judgment accuracy in linear tasks in 
which most people tried to follow abstract rules. In contrast, episodic memory was 
related to judgment accuracy in multiplicative tasks in which most people relied on 
exemplar-based strategies. Furthermore, working memory did not predict performance 
in multiplicative tasks above episodic memory. Thus, largely in line with theories in 
judgment and decision making—and even more with categorization theories (Ashby & 
O’Brien, 2005; Juslin et al., 2008; Smith et al., 1998)—these results suggest that rule-
based and exemplar-based strategies tap into different memory abilities. 
The idea that memory abilities may affect not only how well people execute a 
strategy but also what strategy they choose has attracted much attention (Bröder, 2003; 
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Mata, von Helversen et al., 2012). Past research particularly focused on the role of 
working memory for adaptive strategy selection (Craig & Lewandowsky , 2012; 
Lewandowsky et al., 2012; McDaniel, Cahill, Robbins, & Wiener, 2014). In our 
study, we found that episodic memory predicted the probability with which a person 
was best described by an exemplar-based strategy in the multiplicative task. Working 
memory capacity, however, did not affect strategy selection above episodic memory, 
suggesting that working memory could be less important for adaptive strategy 
selection than previously assumed (Lewandowsky et al., 2012; Mata, Pachur et al., 
2012). Next, we discuss in detail how memory abilities may influence judgment 
strategies and performance. 
The Influence of Memory Abilities on Rule-based Strategies 
 Rule-based strategies have often been understood as serial, capacity-
constrained hypothesis-testing processes that demand high working memory capacity 
(Ashby & O’Brien, 2005; Brehmer, 1994; Juslin et al., 2003, 2008). Supporting the 
idea that working memory capacity is indispensable for making rule-based judgments, 
we found that working memory was related to judgment accuracy in linear tasks in 
which participants’ judgments were, overall, best described by a linear rule. This result 
resonates well with previous findings showing that successfully adopting a rule-based 
strategy is impeded by cognitive load (Filoteo et al., 2010; Hoffmann et al., 2013). 
Theoretically, two major components of rule-based strategies contribute to the 
relationship between working memory capacity and judgment accuracy. First, 
abstracting linear rules may require maintaining the previous judgment object in 
working memory and comparing it to the current judgment object (Juslin et al., 2008; 
Pachur & Olsson, 2012). Second, executing a rule-based strategy may involve mental 
updating of the judgment estimate and inhibiting irrelevant cue information. In line 
with the latter idea, we found that working memory capacity promoted executing the 
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chosen strategy more consistently in linear tasks, and strategy execution, in turn, 
predicted judgment accuracy. This finding matches previous research suggesting that 
working memory capacity influences how accurately people apply decision rules (Del 
Missier et al., 2013). 
Our results, however, seem to contradict findings by Rolison, Evans, Walsh, 
and Dennis (2011) who suggested that working memory capacity is required only for 
learning negative, and not positive relationships between the cues and the criterion. In 
contrast, we found that working memory also predicted how successful people were at 
learning positive cue–criterion relationships. However, our study also used more 
predictive cues than Rolison et al.’s study (four cues instead of two). One explanation 
could be that both negative cue–criterion relationships and a higher number of cues 
make testing of alternative hypotheses more difficult. Possibly, people with low 
working memory capacity can still test hypotheses about two cues, whereas only high 
working memory capacity allows people to consider more alternative hypotheses 
(Dougherty & Hunter, 2003). 
Episodic memory, in our study, did not directly predict judgment accuracy in 
linear tasks, suggesting that episodic memory is less important than working memory 
capacity for making rule-based judgments. However, memory skills are not 
independent of each other. Replicating findings from memory research (Del Missier et 
al., 2013; Mogle et al., 2008; Unsworth, 2010), we found that working memory and 
episodic memory are moderately correlated, probably reflecting that working memory 
is needed to encode and retrieve information from long-term memory. Consequently, 
episodic memory was indirectly related to accuracy in linear tasks through its 
correlation with working memory (r = -.14, with the correlation computed as the 
product of the correlation between working memory and episodic memory, r = .41, 
and the standardized coefficient from working memory to linear judgment accuracy, 
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standardized coefficient = -.35). Possibly, this indirect relationship suggests that 
episodic memory is still needed to retrieve cue weights when making a judgment. 
The Influence of Memory Abilities on Exemplar-based Strategies 
Surprisingly few studies have investigated how episodic memory is linked to 
strategies and performance in judgments or decision making. Our study emphasizes 
how important episodic memory is for making exemplar-based judgments. We found 
clear evidence that episodic memory predicts judgment accuracy in multiplicative 
tasks in which participants’ judgments were best described by an exemplar-based 
strategy. This result is in line with previous studies suggesting that people engage in 
strategic memorization when adopting exemplar-based strategies (Juslin et al., 2008; 
Olsson et al., 2006) and further supports the theoretical link between episodic memory 
trace and exemplar models (Hintzman, 1984, 1986). 
In contrast to the linear task, we found no direct link between working memory 
capacity and judgments in the multiplicative task suggesting that working memory 
does not contribute to performance above episodic memory. Thus, even if exemplar 
processes rely on controlled retrieval (e.g., Karlsson et al., 2008) they appear to 
require less working memory than a rule-based strategy. This result may contradict 
previous findings that working memory helps solve different judgment and 
categorization tasks (Craig & Lewandowsky, 2012; Lewandowsky, 2011; 
Lewandowsky et al., 2012; Weaver & Stewart, 2012). 
Our results might differ from the previous literature because we investigated 
how successfully people generalized their performance to new items, whereas 
previous studies focused mostly on the learning process. In Lewandowsky’s (2011) 
study, for instance, a learning parameter best captured variations in working memory 
capacity across six different categorization tasks. In addition, we assessed judgment 
performance—because of time restrictions—with only two tasks, using accuracy in the 
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four test blocks as manifest indicators. Accordingly, our measurement focused more 
strongly on variance specific to each judgment task, whereas past research 
concentrated on the variance shared among different judgment or categorization tasks 
(Craig & Lewandowsky, 2012; Lewandowsky, 2011; Lewandowsky et al., 2012; 
Weaver & Stewart, 2012). Hence, it is possible that learning in rule- and exemplar-
based judgment tasks requires working-memory capacity, whereas executing a learned 
strategy depends on working memory capacity only for rule-based judgments. 
However, as mentioned above, working memory capacity was moderately correlated 
with episodic memory in our study. Accordingly, working memory was helpful for 
solving not only linear tasks but also multiplicative tasks: Higher working memory 
capacity predicted higher judgment accuracy in the multiplicative task through its 
connection to episodic memory (r = -.17). In sum, successfully solving judgment tasks 
relies on the interplay between episodic memory and working memory—an 
interpretation that is generally in line with the idea that learning in a huge variety of 
judgment tasks depends on working memory capacity (Weaver & Stewart, 2012). 
Memory Abilities and Strategy Use 
In the past decade, research has focused mostly on task characteristics as a 
determinant of judgment strategies (Juslin et al., 2003, 2008; Karlsson et al., 2007; 
von Helversen et al., 2013; von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2009). Consistent with prior 
research, we found that most participants relied on a rule-based strategy in a linear 
task and shifted to exemplar-based strategies in multiplicative tasks (Hoffmann et al., 
2013; Juslin et al., 2008; Karlsson et al., 2007). However, individual differences, such 
as age or intelligence, can also drive shifts between different types of strategies 
(Bröder, 2003; Mata, von Helversen et al., 2012). Specifically, we argued that memory 
abilities may influence not only how well people execute a strategy but also which 
strategies they select (Beach & Mitchell, 1978; Lemaire & Siegler, 1995; Mata, 
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Pachur, et al., 2012). Whereas neither working memory capacity nor episodic memory 
influenced strategy selection in the linear task, episodic memory fostered the 
probability of selecting an exemplar strategy in the multiplicative task. Furthermore, 
strategy selection partly mediated the relationship between episodic memory and 
judgment performance. This result dovetails with the idea that memory abilities may 
reduce the costs associated with a strategy and, in turn, increase the preference for 
employing a specific strategy (Beach & Mitchell, 1978; Payne et al., 1993; Rieskamp 
& Otto, 2006). 
Following the strategy selection approach, however, working memory capacity 
should also have predicted the extent to which people select a rule-based strategy in 
the linear task. One reason we did not find this relationship could be that rule-based 
strategies act as a default (Karlsson et al., 2008; Olsson et al., 2006). In line with this 
argumentation, few people chose an exemplar strategy in the linear tasks. 
Consequently, only engaging in exemplar-based memorization would require an active 
choice, whereas the success of rule-based strategies may depend more on the effort 
needed to execute the strategy. This explanation is supported by the finding that 
working memory capacity predicted how well the learned strategy was executed in the 
linear task, suggesting that the inability to accurately use a strategy does not 
necessarily lead to a strategy shift. In contrast, how well the learned strategy was 
executed in the multiplicative task was unrelated to episodic memory, suggesting that 
those participants who did not shift to the task-appropriate exemplar-based strategy 
nevertheless applied the rules they learned consistently. 
In sum, our results demonstrate that episodic memory plays an important role 
in strategy selection (Mata, von Helversen et al., 2012) but do not provide any 
evidence that working memory capacity—as previously suggested—predicts more 
adaptive strategy selection (Bröder, 2003; Lewandowsky et al., 2012; Mata, Pachur, et 
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al., 2012). These results emphasize that reducing strategy selection to a question of 
working memory capacity probably oversimplifies the idea of adaptive strategy use. 
Future Directions 
We established a link between explicit memory and judgment strategies. One 
puzzle that remains to be solved is the degree to which judgments rely upon implicit 
memory. Specifically, scholars have heatedly debated if implicit perceptual memory 
supports learning in similarity-based categorizations (Knowlton & Squire, 1993; 
Nosofsky & Zaki, 1998; Palmeri & Flanery, 1999; Smith & Grossman, 2008). In our 
study, we used several established tasks to measure implicit perceptual memory and to 
examine its relation to exemplar-based judgments. However, correlations between 
implicit memory tasks were low so we did not include implicit memory in the 
analysis. Accordingly, the relation between implicit perceptual memory and exemplar-
based judgments remains unclear. 
A related unresolved debate deals with the question of how implicit procedural 
memory contributes to learning in judgment and categorization (Ashby & Maddox, 
2005; Newell et al., 2011). Procedural memory underlies the learning of motor skills 
(Squire & Zola, 1996; Willingham, 1998) and may also contribute to learning 
“structured categories containing many exemplars that could not be easily learned via 
a logical reasoning process” (Ashby & O’Brien, 2005, p. 86). In these information-
integration tasks, the optimal strategy is difficult to verbalize and learning requires 
many repetitions (Ashby & Maddox, 2005). In line with the idea that procedural 
learning underlies information integration, it has been found that disrupting motor 
processing harms performance in information-integration tasks more strongly than 
performance with rule-based categorizations (Ashby, Ell, & Waldron, 2003; Maddox, 
Bohil, & Ing, 2004; but see Zaki & Kleinschmidt, 2014).  
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Structurally, information-integration tasks in categorization are most similar to 
linear judgment tasks, which means implicit procedural memory might help learning 
in these tasks. Judgment research has instead suggested that people test specific 
hypotheses when learning to solve linear tasks (Brehmer, 1994; Juslin et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, it has been shown that participants acquire explicit knowledge about the 
cues’ importance when solving information-integration tasks (Lagnado et al., 2006). 
These results complement our finding that performance in the linear task was 
predicted by working memory, indicating that explicit reasoning was involved (Ashby 
& O’Brien, 2005). The degree to which implicit procedural memory plays a role in 
learning to solve judgment tasks is an open question that should be tackled by future 
research. 
Another unresolved problem is the question of how far the relationship 
between memory abilities and performance found in test can be generalized to the 
learning phase. Performance at test strongly depends on how well the task was 
learned, suggesting that those memory abilities that influence test performance should 
also matter during learning. Yet how people learn to rely on linear rules or exemplars 
is barely understood and only a few attempts have been made to understand and 
mathematically describe the learning process (e.g., Kelley & Busemeyer, 2008; 
Lagnado et al., 2006; Speekenbrink & Shanks, 2010). 
A prominent model that is thought to capture cue learning on a trial-by-trial 
basis is the Gluck and Bower (1988) model (see also Kelley & Busemeyer, 2008), 
which assumes that all cue weights are updated with the same learning speed—a 
learning process possibly supported by implicit procedural learning. Thus, learning to 
make judgments might be driven largely by implicit procedural memory and be less 
dependent on working memory. In contrast, a capacity-limited hypothesis-testing 
process may consider and update only one hypothesis in a trial. In line with this 
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hypothesis, Markant and Gureckis (2014) found in rule-based categorizations that 
participants with the opportunity to sample information according to their current 
hypothesis outperformed those who saw the same stimuli but could not actively 
choose them. Thus, a learning process that relies on hypothesis testing may depend 
even more strongly on working memory than applying a rule-based strategy during 
test. 
Similarly, although we found that performance in a multiplicative task depends 
more on episodic memory and less on working memory, it is possible that learning to 
solve a multiplicative task would more strongly involve working memory. 
Successfully learning to rely on exemplar memory possibly requires not only the 
controlled retrieval of exemplars, but also strengthening the association between the 
exemplar and the outcome criteria, a process that could benefit from working memory 
capacity (Lewandowsky, 2011). In sum, although our study offers some insights into 
the relationship between memory abilities and judgment performance, it is far less 
clear what abilities are involved in learning these tasks. 
Conclusions 
Twenty years ago, Elke Weber and colleagues (1995) reminded us that we 
should not forget memory when thinking about how people make judgments. Our 
results suggest that different judgment strategies take advantage of specific memory 
processes: Whereas rule-based strategies draw on working memory capacity, 
exemplar-based strategies exploit encoding and retrieval processes in episodic 
memory. Thus, knowledge about working memory and long-term memory may help 
explain how people successfully solve judgment tasks that range from daily judgments 
such as estimating the probability of rainfall to professional judgments such as judging 
the quality of a job candidate. 
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Footnotes 
1. In a pilot study, 12 participants rated 100 German sentences for plausibility. 
Only highly plausible or implausible sentences were included in the final reading span. 
2. In a pilot study, we included a threshold procedure using 40 independent 
nouns. The results showed that participants correctly identified half of the nouns using 
a mask with nine black squares so that 56% of the noun was masked. 
3. To assure that old and new sounds were equally easy to identify among 
distractors, we conducted a pilot study with 24 subjects: Half of the participants heard 
half of the sounds without noise in the study phase; the other half heard the remaining 
sounds in the study phase. Afterward, old and new sounds were presented in noise and 
participants were asked to identify them among two distractors. For the final 
experiment, old and new sounds were matched on performance for old sounds. 
4. We also fitted an exemplar model with four attention parameters to 
participants’ judgments. However, replicating results from previous studies 
(Hoffmann et al., 2013; von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2008), this model failed to 
outperform an exemplar model with one parameter in predicting participants’ 
judgments for validation items in either the linear task (RMSD = 5.3) or the 
multiplicative task (RMSD = 5.9). 
5. Judgment accuracy was measured in RMSD with lower RMSD indicating 
more accurate judgments. Accordingly, negative correlations imply that higher 
working memory predicts higher judgment accuracy. 
6. A structural model testing for all mediation effects simultaneously led to 
similar conclusions: Overall, this model achieved a good fit, χ2(97) = 89.63, SF = 
1.03, p = .690, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00, SRMR = .04, BIC = 13,940. Testing for 
mediation effects suggested only an indirect effect of episodic memory over strategy 
selection in the multiplicative task on judgment accuracy in this task (r = -.13, p = 
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.013). Neither the indirect effect of working memory on judgment accuracy in the 
multiplicative task nor the indirect effect of working memory on judgment accuracy in 
the linear task was significant (multiplicative: r = -.05, p = .282; linear: r = -.003, p = 
.743). 
7. Testing for both mediation effects simultaneously led to similar conclusions: 
Overall, this model achieved a good fit, χ2(98) = 96.75, SF = 1.05, p = .517, CFI = 
1.00, RMSEA = .00, SRMR = .04, BIC = 15,253. Testing for mediation effects 
suggested only an indirect effect of working memory on judgment accuracy in the 
linear task through strategy execution (r = -.11, p = .021). The indirect effect of 
episodic memory on judgment accuracy in the multiplicative task was not significant 
(r = -.02, p = .389). 
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Table 1 
Training and Validation Items Used in the Multiplicative and the Linear Task. The 
Judgment Criterion Was Derived from Equation 1 (Linear) and Equation 2 
(Multiplicative) 
Cue values Judgment criterion Set 
Cue 1 Cue 2 Cue 3 Cue 4 Multiplicative Linear 
2 1 0 3 2 14 Training 
1 4 1 4 5 22 Training 
0 3 1 2 2 13 Training 
0 2 3 0 1 12 Training 
5 5 4 0 29 43 Training 
0 4 5 4 12 26 Training 
2 4 3 0 9 26 Training 
1 4 3 5 13 27 Training 
1 0 2 4 1 12 Training 
1 0 0 2 1 6 Training 
5 3 3 5 21 40 Training 
1 1 5 5 7 22 Training 
1 2 0 5 2 15 Training 
5 5 0 1 4 36 Training 
0 4 3 1 4 19 Training 
4 2 1 3 6 27 Training 
0 5 2 3 6 22 Training 
5 5 2 4 22 43 Training 
5 1 3 4 9 33 Training 
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Cue values Judgment criterion Set 
Cue 1 Cue 2 Cue 3 Cue 4 Multiplicative Linear 
4 0 2 4 3 24 Training 
1 4 1 5 6 23 Training 
3 0 5 5 3 27 Training 
0 2 5 0 2 16 Training 
1 5 2 4 10 27 Training 
3 4 5 5 30 39 Training 
3 5 1 4 10 33 Validation 
3 4 4 3 21 35 Validation 
5 0 3 4 4 30 Validation 
3 4 2 5 14 33 Validation 
5 0 5 5 4 35 Validation 
3 2 0 2 2 20 Validation 
2 3 4 0 9 25 Validation 
4 5 4 5 36 44 Validation 
5 0 5 3 4 33 Validation 
4 3 0 1 3 26 Validation 
2 1 2 0 3 15 Validation 
2 5 2 3 12 30 Validation 
4 0 0 2 2 18 Validation 
4 1 1 1 4 22 Validation 
3 3 3 5 15 32 Validation 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for the Memory and Judgment Tasks 
Task M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Operation span 58.4 11.7 -1.3 2.2 
Reading span 57.6 11.8 -1.2 2.1 
Symmetry span 29.9 7.4 -0.7 0.1 
Recognition (% recalled) 86.5 8.8 -0.7 0.2 
Cued recall (% recalled) 41.4 19.6 0.3 -0.2 
Free recall (% recalled) 44.6 16.5 0.3 -0.1 
Speeded presentation (ms) 55 1023 0.2 5.3 
Degraded presentation (ms) -1293 3471 0.4 3.5 
Identification in noise (ms) -371 788 -0.9 3.1 
Linear judgment     
  Last training block 6.1 2.4 1.4 4.1 
  Test (mean) 5.4 1.9 0.5 0.6 
  Strategy weight (n = 262) .22 .28 1.32 0.81 
Multiplicative judgment     
  Last training block 5.3 1.8 0.6 0.4 
  Test (mean) 5.1 1.9 0.9 0.5 
  Strategy weight (n = 275) .60 .38 -0.52 -1.26 
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Table 3 
Model Fits (and Standard Deviations) in the Linear and the Multiplicative Task 
Note. RMSD: root mean square deviation 
Model fit Model 
Baseline  Linear  Exemplar  
Linear task    
  Training RMSD 9.0 (1.3) 4.5 (1.4) 5.3 (1.6) 
  Test RMSD 7.3 (1.6) 3.8 (1.4) 5.2 (1.5) 
  Classification (n) 17 220 42 
Multiplicative task    
  Training RMSD 7.3 (1.2) 4.7 (0.9) 4.7 (1.1) 
  Test RMSD 6.9 (1.9) 4.6 (1.3) 4.2 (1.1) 
  Classification (n) 4 99 176 
